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Abstract
The paper revisits the debate on trickle-down growth in view of the widely
discussed evolution of the earnings and income distribution that followed a mas-
sive expansion of higher education. We propose a dynamic general equilibrium
model to dynamically evaluate whether economic growth triggered by an increase
in public education expenditure on behalf of those with high learning ability even-
tually trickles down to low-ability workers and serves them better than redistrib-
utive transfers. Our results suggest that, in the shorter run, low-skilled workers
lose. They are better o¤ from promoting equally sized redistributive transfers.
In the longer run, however, low-skilled workers eventually benet more from the
education policy. Interestingly, although the expansion of education leads to
sustained increases in the skill premium, income inequality follows an inverted
U-shaped evolution.
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"Since 1979, our economy has more than doubled in size, but most of
that growth has owed to a fortunate few." (Barack Obama, December 4,
2013)
1 Introduction
Whether economic growth trickles down to the socially less fortunate has been a key
debate for many decades in the US and elsewhere (e.g. Kuznets, 1955; Thornton,
Agnello and Link, 1978; Hirsch, 1980; Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Piketty, 1997). In
particular, social desirability and choices of growth-promoting policies may critically
depend on their expected trickle-down e¤ects. For instance, massive expansion of high
school and college education throughout the 20th century has led to a surge in the
relative supply of skilled labor (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Gordon, 2013). Goldin and
Katz (2008) document the important role of the public sector for this development,
particularly between 1950 and 1970.1 Despite steady economic growth, however, me-
dian (full-time equivalent) earnings of males have almost stagnated from the 1970s
onwards (e.g. Katz and Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu and Autor, 2012; DeNavas-Walt,
Proctor and Smith, 2013). Moreover, earnings of less educated males fell considerably
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011, Tab. 1a). Thus, under the hypothesis that technological
change has been endogenously skill-biased to the expansion of public education, the
evidence suggests a pronounced equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ of this policy intervention.
In this paper, we propose a comprehensive dynamic general equilibrium framework
with directed technical change, heterogenous agents and a key role of human capi-
tal for economic growth to evaluate the e¤ects of public expenditure reforms on the
evolution of living standards over time. In particular, we comparatively examine two
public expenditure policies: public education nance on behalf of high-ability workers
and income transfers towards low-ability workers who do not acquire more advanced
education (e.g. because of limited ability). We investigate whether economic growth
1For instance, the fraction of college students in publicly controlled institutions gradually increased
between 1900 and 1970. Between 1950 and 1970, it increased from 0.5 to almost 0.7 among students
with four years of college attendance (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Fig. 7.7).
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triggered by an increase in public education expenditure on behalf of those with high
learning ability eventually trickles down to low-ability workers and serves them better
than redistributive transfers. Relatedly, we examine whether expanding education of
wealthy, high-ability households inevitably raises inequality of earnings and income
over time.
Whether and when growth promoted by education expansion trickles down to low-
skilled workers is a key question for at least three reasons. First, the evolution of the
earnings distribution has recently provoked an intensive policy debate in the US and
elsewhere (e.g. Stiglitz, 2012; Deaton, 2013; Mankiw, 2013; Piketty, 2014).2 For in-
stance, in his maybe most widely received speech of his US presidency (December 4,
2013), Barack Obama referred to it as "the dening challenge of our time", criticiz-
ing that "a trickle-down ideology became more prominent".3 He also urged that "we
need to set aside the belief that government cannot do anything about reducing in-
equality". In fact, the tax-transfer system in the US is rather unsuccessful to improve
living standards of the working-poor, compared to other advanced countries (Gould
and Wething, 2012). Second, upward social mobility has proved being severely limited
by intergenerational transmission of learning ability and/or human capital, implying
that a signicant fraction of individuals may not acquire more than basic education for
a long time to come.4 It is thus important to know whether those individuals prot
from publicly nanced education expansion, particularly compared to the alternative
policy of redistributive transfers which are directly targeted to less educated work-
ers.5 To focus our analysis on this issue we deliberately rule out social mobility in
2The earnings distribution has changed markedly also in Continental Europe, although later than
in the US; see e.g. Dustmann, Ludsteck and Schönberg (2009) for evidence on Germany.
3See www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-o¢ ce/2013/12/04/remarks-president-economic-mobility
4See e.g. Corak (2013). There is overwhelming evidence for the hypothesis that the education
of parents a¤ects the human capital level of children, even when controlling for family income. For
instance, Plug and Vijverberg (2003) and Black, Devereux and Salvanes (2005) show that children of
high-skilled parents have a higher probability of being high-skilled.
5There are, of course, many other policy options to improve economic situations of the poor which
we do not consider because of our macroeconomic focus. For instance, there is a large literature on
the e¤ectiveness of programmes to promote rather basic education on behalf of low-income earners or
the unemployed. Some of the evidence suggests that their success is very limited unless governments
intervene at a very young age (see e.g. the survey by Cunha, Heckman, Lochner and Masterov, 2006).
See, however, Osikominu (2013) for qualifying evidence on long term (versus short term) active labor
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our model. Third, the literature on directed technological change, initiated by Von
Weizsäcker (1966) and advanced by Acemoglu (1998, 2002), suggests to account for
the possibility that an increase in the supply of human capital leads to skill-biased
technological change, thus contributing to the di¤erential evolution of living standards
across individuals in the rst place. Particularly, it is not evident whether and when
workers with only basic education benet from an increase in the economys supply of
human capital. It is therefore salient for addressing our research questions to capture
the possibility that technological progress does not automatically benet high-skilled
and low-skilled labor in a similar fashion.6
To illustrate this point, we start out with a simple model without directed technical
change where we allow for human capital externalities which benet both types of
workers alike. We then proceed to compare the speed of trickle-down of this model
to that in a comprehensive framework with R&D-based directed technical change.
Standard analyses of directed technological change models are inadequate to enter
the trickle-down debate, because they exclusively focus on the long run and assume
that skill supply is exogenous. For instance, as acknowledged by Autor and Acemoglu
(2012), such analyses are unsuccessful to explain falling earnings at the bottom of
the distribution of income. Rather, our goal is to dynamically evaluate the impact
of an increase in public education expenditure that potentially a¤ects both R&D and
education decisions, is in line with the observed income dynamics in the last decades,
and helps to predict and understand future dynamics.7
More specically, our framework rests on the following features: (i) We focus on
households which do not accumulate human capital, but may benet from expansion
of publicly nanced education of others   either dynamically through trickle-down
market policy.
6In an interesting recent paper, Che and Zhang (2014) argue that the higher education expansion
in China in the late 1990s had a causal positive e¤ect on technological change particularly in human
capital intensive industries, suggesting that technical change endogenously benets primarily high-
skilled workers.
7We employ the algorithm of Trimborn, Koch and Steger (2008) to analyze the transitional dynam-
ics of the resulting non-linear, highly dimensional, saddle-point stable, di¤erential-algebraic system.
Despite the complexity of our model, the long run equilibrium can be derived and characterized
analytically. This is important for calibrating the model and for understanding basic mechanisms.
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growth or statically through complementarity of high-skilled and low-skilled labor; (ii)
growth is endogenously driven by technological change which may complement di¤erent
types of skills in a di¤erential fashion; (iii) the government can extend redistributive
transfers and promote economic growth by publicly nancing education; (iv) there are
distortionary taxes on (labor and capital) income and capital gains; (v) the accumu-
lation of physical capital, human capital and R&D-based knowledge capital interact
with public policy in determining the evolution of living standards over time.
Our key ndings may be summarized as follows. First, when the government raises
the fraction of tax revenue devoted to publicly nance education on behalf of high-
ability individuals, net income and the wage rate of low-ability individuals rst de-
crease compared to the baseline scenario without policy reform. Thus, consistent with
empirical evidence, our analysis suggests that education expansion is followed by ris-
ing inequality and temporarily lower wages at the bottom of the earnings distribution.
Later in the transition, the economic situation of the least educated improves and they
eventually become better o¤ than without education expansion. Second, an increase
in the fraction of the tax revenue devoted to redistributive transfers rather than public
education expenditure leads to short run gains but long run losses for this group. Thus,
our analysis suggests a dynamic policy trade-o¤ from the perspective of the socially
less fortunate. This is not necessarily so in the simple model without directed technical
change we analyze rst (section 3): in this model, education expansion is always inferior
to transfers from the perspective of low-ability workers in the case where there are no
human capital externalities; if human capital externalities are su¢ ciently strong, the
picture becomes qualitatively the one suggested by the comprehensive model. Examin-
ing the comprehensive model is more compelling though for the main argument and for
a quantitative analysis because it allows for the possibility that education expansion
triggers technological change which primarily benets high-skilled workers. Third, our
calibration to the US economy implies that it takes a long time until growth triggered
by education expansion trickles-down to the poor and makes them better o¤ than un-
der redistributive transfers. Fourth, the speed of trickle-down is slower, the higher the
(derived) elasticity of substitution between the two types of workers in the economy.
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Fifth, promoting human capital accumulation implies that earnings inequality increases
on impact and then further rises considerably over time. This also raises overall in-
equality of net income earlier in the transition. However, although remaining higher
than under redistributive transfers, income inequality eventually decreases later in the
transition because of (albeit limited) convergence of asset holdings between the two
types of workers. In other words, education expansion leads to an inverted U-shaped
"Kuznets curve" evolution of income inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briey discuss the related
literature. Section 3 starts out with a simple model highlighting important features
of our analysis. In section 4, we set up a comprehensive growth model designed for a
quantitative analysis. Section 5 characterizes its equilibrium analytically. In section
6 we employ numerical analysis to dynamically evaluate the trickle down dynamics of
policy reforms. Section 7 focusses on the evolution of the distribution of earnings and
net income across di¤erent types of workers. The last section concludes.
2 Related Literature
We shall not attempt to review the vast literature on the interplay between economic
growth and inequality. Rather, we selectively discuss the most related work. In their
seminal paper, Galor and Zeira (1993) show that human capital investments are subop-
timally low under credit constraints. According to their analysis, if the wedge between
the borrowing and the lending rate is su¢ ciently large, not only is inequality harmful for
growth but also may it increase over time (i.e., growth does not trickle down). Aghion
and Bolton (1997), Piketty (1997) and Matsuyama (2000) examine the evolution of
wealth distribution under imperfect credit market with xed investment requirements
for entrepreneurial projects. They identify conditions under which growth may trickle
down and argue that (lump sum) wealth redistribution to the poor may speed up this
process by mitigating credit constraints. In contrast to this literature, our focus is
on the interplay between physical capital accumulation, human capital accumulation
and technological change directed to di¤erent types of workers, while abstracting from
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credit constraints. In view of the minor role of credit constrains for education nance
in the US (for a recent study, see e.g. Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2011), this appears
to be a reasonable research strategy in our context. Moreover, we focus on publicly
nanced education and redistribution, nanced by distortionary taxation.
Goldin and Katz (2008) argue that the evolution of skill premia can be explained by
the pace at which the relative supply of skills keeps track with the relative demand for
skills as driven by skill-biased technological change. However, as already pointed out
by Acemoglu and Autor (2012), their analysis does not address the possible feedback
e¤ect of rising skill supply. Such e¤ects result from education expansion via endoge-
nously biased technological change, altering the relative demand for skills. Closest
to our analysis, Acemoglu (1998, 2002) introduces the idea that the relative demand
for di¤erent types of workers via technological change is endogenous to the supply of
human capital. While he focusses on the long run e¤ects of an exogenous increase in
human capital, our interest lies in the transitional dynamics when both the formation of
human capital and the extent and direction of technological change are endogenous to
public policy reforms. Finally, Galor and Moav (2000) examine distributional e¤ects of
biased technological change in a dynamic model of endogenous skill supply. There are
two main di¤erences to our work. First, whereas Galor and Moav (2000) are interested
in the evolution of wage inequality when the rate of (by assumption ability-biased)
productivity growth starts below steady state, we evaluate public policy experiments.
In particular, we consider the dynamic e¤ects of a publicly nanced expansion of ed-
ucation on behalf of high-ability individuals versus redistributive transfers on income
dynamics. Second, in our model technological change is based on R&D decisions which
potentially is skill-biased endogenously.
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3 Simple Model
3.1 Set Up
Consider an innite-horizon framework in continuous time. There are two types of
labor, a unit mass of type h individuals with unit time endowment, capable of accu-
mulating human capital by investing time for education, and a mass l > 0 of type l
individuals, inelastically supplying one unit of labor each period. For modern times,
human capital accumulation of a representative type h individual may be interpreted
as higher education attendance after high school graduation.8 Ruling out social mobil-
ity captures intergenerational transmission of learning ability in a pointed form. The
modeling choice is driven by our interest of trickle-down dynamics on behalf of those
(type l individuals) with basic education only.
There is a homogenous consumption good with price normalized to unity. Final
output is produced under perfect competition according to
Y = A
h
(HY )
  1
 + (LY )
  1
 
i  
  1
; (1)
where HY and LY denote the amounts of h type and l type labor in manufacturing
the numeraire good, A > 0 is total factor productivity, and  > 0 is the elasticity of
substitution between the two types of labor. Let h denote the human capital level per
type h individual. We allow for a human capital externality as a channel which may
a¤ect trickle-down growth; that is, A is a non-decreasing function of the human capital
stock per h type individual, h; we write
A = h ,
  0. In the special case  = 0, there is no external e¤ect of human capital accumula-
tion on A and type l individuals are exclusively a¤ected by an increase in h because
of the complementarity of di¤erent types of labor in (1). The representative nal good
8In the US, secondary graduation rates increased quickly through the 20th century and then sta-
bilized (Goldin and Katz, 2008; Tab. 3.1, Fig. 6.1).
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producer maximizes prots, taking both A and the wage rates as given.
Skill accumulation of type h individuals depends, rst, on the time investment
in education (Lucas, 1988). Second, it depends on the amount of publicly nanced
human capital ("teachers") per type h individual devoted to educational production.
Moreover, it is characterized by intergenerational human capital transmission and de-
preciation over time. Let u and 1  u denote the fraction of time a type h individual
supplies to the labor market and devotes to education, respectively. Let hE denote the
teaching input in educational production per type h individual. Their human capital
stock evolves according to
_h = (1  u)  hE h   Hh; (2)
where H > 0 is the depreciation rate of human capital and the other parameters fulll
 > 0,  2 (0; 1),  > 0,   0,  +  < 1.  < 1 captures decreasing returns to
time use in education. If  > 0, there is intergenerational human capital transmission.
H > 0 and  +  < 1 imply that, in the long run, the individual human capital level
is stationary. Suppose that the teaching input is given by9
hE = #h; (3)
where # > 0 is the fraction of human capital devoted to education. In labor market
equilibrium, uh = HY + hE, i.e., HY = (u  #)h; moreover, LY = l.
Our human capital accumulation process is similar to Lucas (1988), extended for
publicly provided education. Substituting (3) into (2), we nd _h = (1  u)#h+  
Hh. In Lucas (1988),  = 1 (constant rather than decreasing returns to time invest-
ment),  = 0 (no publicly provided education), and  = 1 such that the stock of human
capital per capita could grow with a positive rate even in the long run, which we rule
out with our parameter restrictions.
Teaching input is publicly nanced by income taxation. In each period, a fraction
9In any meaningful equilibrium, the fraction must be lower than the fraction of time devoted to
labor market participation, # < u.
8
sE > 0 of contemporaneous total tax revenue is used to publicly nance teachers
in the education sector, endogenously determining policy parameter #. Moreover, a
constant fraction sT > 0 of the tax revenue is devoted to nance transfers to individuals
who own income below some income threshold, which may be thought of social welfare
expenditure; sE+sT  1. The possibility sE+sT < 1 allows for a third public spending
category which may additively enter the utility function (like public expenditure for
defense, the legal system, public order, and safety). Alternatively, the third category
may be interpreted as government waste.
Let wl denote the wage rate (and gross wage income) of type l individuals and
wh the wage rate per unit of human capital supplied by type h individuals; supply-
ing a fraction u of their unit time endowment to the labor market, their gross wage
income reads as whuh. We focus throughout on the case where type l individuals
earn (endogenously) less than type h individuals at all times. Marginal tax rates
on labor income are, if anything, higher for type h individuals. Formally, suppose
that the marginal income tax rate is given by an increasing step-function ~() fullling
~(whuh)  h >  l  ~(wl). We focus on the case in which the step-function ~ is such
that h and  l are time-invariant for the income ranges we consider.10 Suppose that
only type l individuals earn su¢ ciently little to be eligible for a transfer payment,
denoted by T . Their income level then reads as yl := (1   l)wl + T , whereas after-tax
income of type h individuals is given by yh := (1  h)whuh.
Denote the level of consumption of a type j individual by cj, j 2 fh; lg. Let
subscript t on a variable index time (suppressed if not leading to confusion). As there
is no physical capital, individuals do not save, i.e. cjt = yjt for all t, j 2 fh; lg. Suppose
that intertemporal utility of a type h individual is given by
Uh =
Z 1
0
(cht)
1    1
1   e
 tdt =
Z 1
0
((1  h)whtutht)1    1
1   e
 tdt. (4)
The optimal sequence of time allocation, futg1t=0, maximizes (4) subject to (2), taking
10Ensuring this outcome may require that the mapping from income brackets to marginal tax rates
is adjusted when income levels grow, i.e. function ~() is adjusted over time.
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the path of hE as given. The equilibrium analysis of the model proposed in this section
is standard and relegated to an online-appendix.
3.2 Policy Evaluation
We now contrast the dynamic e¤ects of an expansion of education (increase in sE)
and of higher transfers (increase in sT ) on income yl of type l individuals. For given
tax rates, an increase in sE raises the fraction of human capital devoted to education,
#, whereas an increase in sT raises transfer payment T . Throughout the paper, we
maintain the assumption that individuals do not anticipate shocks in policy parameters.
0 100 200 300 400 500
t
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
yl,t yl
0 50 100 150 200 250
t
1.00
1.05
1.10
1.15
1.20
1.25
yl,t ylPlot (a): =0 Plot (b): =0.25
Figure 0: Time path of normalized income, yl=yl , in three scenarios: solid (blue) line:
baseline scenario (sT and sE remain constant), horizontal dashed line: sT increases by ve
percentage points), increasing dashed line: sE increases by ve percentage points. Set of
parameters: sT = 0:07, sE = 0:1 (pre-shock levels), h = 0:35,  l = 0:17, H = 0:023,
 = 0:84,  = 0:25,  = 0:35,  = 1:5,  = 0:02,  = 1:91, l = 0:15. The calibration
strategy is described in appendix.
Let yl denote the net income (and consumption) of a type-l household in initial
steady state (before the policy reform). Figure 0 illustrates the e¤ects of increases in
sE ("education expansion") and in sT ("redistribution extension") by ve percentage
points on normalized net income yl=yl . Panel (a) treats the case without human
capital externality ( = 0). The increasing (dashed) line shows that an increase in sE
leaves low-ability workers worse o¤ early in the transition compared to the baseline
scenario without policy reform. This reects a reallocation of high-skilled labor away
from nal goods production (decrease in HY ) towards the education sector, thereby
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depressing the marginal product of type l workers (decrease in @Y=@LY ). Because
of a complementarity between both types of labor in production function (1), later
in the transition, yl rises as human capital accumulates. However, for  = 0, type l
individuals turn out being worse o¤ than under the alternative policy of raising sT ,
which once and for all raises living standards of the recipients of transfer income, as
indicated by the horizontal (dashed) line in panel (a). In Panel (b), we consider the
same policy shocks for the case where there is a human capital externality ( = 0:25).
Thus, human capital accumulation triggered by expanding education now also increases
total factor productivity. Now, although living standards again drop on impact in
response to an increase in sE, type l individuals become better o¤ in the longer run,
compared to the e¤ect of increasing sT . Comparing the results suggested by panel
(a) and (b) of Figure 0 highlights the salient role of endogenous technological progress
which we examine next in a more comprehensive way for the purpose of quantitative
analysis.
4 Comprehensive Model
The model in the previous section is too simple for a quantitative policy evaluation. We
next propose a comprehensive model with endogenous and directed technical change.
It features may be viewed as a microfoundation of human capital externalities. Unlike
in the simple model, however, education expansion does not automatically benet low-
skilled workers through increases in total factor productivity. Its e¤ect runs through
R&D investment which may be primarily directed to high-skilled intensive production.
We also introduce savings and capital accumulation.
4.1 Firms
There is again a homogenous nal good with price normalized to unity. Following
Acemoglu (2002), nal output is now produced under perfect competition according to
Y =
h
(XH)
" 1
" + (XL)
" 1
"
i "
" 1
; (5)
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" > 0. XL and XH are composite intermediate inputs. They are also produced under
perfect competition, combining capital goods ("machines") with human capital and
low-skilled labor, respectively. Formally, we have
XH = (H
X)1 
AHZ
0
xH(i)
di; (6)
XL = (L
X)1 
ALZ
0
xL(i)
di; (7)
0 <  < 1, where xH(i) and xL(i) are inputs of machines, indexed by i, which are
complementary to the amount of human capital in this sector, HX , and low-skilled
labor, LX , respectively. The mass ("number") of machines, AH and AL, expands
through horizontal innovations, as introduced below. The initial number of both types
of machines are given and positive; AH;0 > 0, AL;0 > 0.
In each machine sector there is one monopoly rm   the innovator or the buyer of
a blueprint for a machine. They produce with a "one-to-one" constant-returns to scale
technology by using one unit of nal output to produce one machine unit. The total
capital stock, K, in terms of the nal good, thus reads as
K =
AHZ
0
xH(i)di+
ALZ
0
xL(i)di: (8)
Machine investments are nanced by bonds sold to households. In each machine sector
there is a competitive fringe which can produce a perfect substitute for an existing
machine (without violating patent rights) but is less productive: input coe¢ cients are
higher than that of the incumbents by a factor  2 (1; 1

] in both sectors.11 Parameter
 determines the price-setting power of rms and allows us to disentangle the price-
mark up from output elasticities, which is important for a reasonable calibration of the
model. Physical capital depreciates at rate K  0.
There is free entry into two kinds of competitive R&D sectors. In one sector, a
11See Aghion and Howitt (2005), among others, for a similar way of capturing a competitive fringe.
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representative R&D rm directs human capital to develop blueprints for new machines
used to produce the human capital intensive composite input, XH , the other sector to
produce XL. To each new idea a patent of innite length is awarded. Following Jones
(1995), ideas for new machines in the R&D sectors are generated according to
_AH = ~H(AH)
HAH ; ~H =   (HAH) ; (9)
_AL = ~L(AL)
HAL ; ~L =   (HAL ) ; (10)
whereHAH andH
A
L denote human capital input in the R&D sector directed to the human
capital intensive and low-skilled intensive intermediate goods sector, respectively.  > 0
is a R&D productivity parameter.  2 (0; 1) captures a negative R&D ("duplication")
externality (Jones, 1995) which measures the gap between privately perceived constant
R&D returns of human capital and socially decreasing returns. We assume that  2
(0; 1).  > 0 captures a positive ("standing on shoulders") spillover e¤ect.12
4.2 Households
There are again two types of individuals, indexed by j 2 fl; hg, which di¤er with
respect to their learning ability. The learning technology is identical to section 3: only
type h individuals can accumulate human capital, according to (2). We now allow
population sizes of both types, Nh > 0 and Nl > 0, to grow at the same and constant
exponential rate, n  0. We normalize the initial size of the type h population to
unity, Nh;0 = 1, and denote Nl;0 = l. Preferences of individuals of type j 2 fl; hg are
represented by the standard utility function
Uj =
1Z
0
(cjt)
1    1
1   e
 ( n)tdt; (11)
 > 0, where cjt is consumption of a type j individual at time t.
12Two remarks are in order. First, Acemoglu (1998, 2002) focusses on a "lab-equipment" version
of the R&D process. Since empirically R&D costs are mainly salaries for R&D personnel, we prefer
specications (9) and (10). Second,  < 1 implies that growth is "semi-endogenous" (Jones, 1995),
i.e. would cease in the long run if we population growth were absent.
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Households can hold bonds   providing capital which serves as input for machine
producers, and equity   thereby nancing blueprints for machine producers. Financial
markets are always in (no-arbitrage) equilibrium. Asset holdings in per member of
dynasty j are denoted by aj. Initial asset holdings are given by ah;0 > 0, al;0 > 0.
The interest rate for bonds is denoted by r. Dividends from equity holdings and bond
holdings are taxed by the same constant rate  r. Maintaining the same labor income
schedule as in section 3, assets accumulate according to
_ah = yh   ch; with yh := [(1   r)r   n]ah + (1  h)whuh; (12)
_al = yl   cl; with yl := [(1   r)r   n]al + (1   l)wl + T . (13)
yj again denotes net income of type j 2 fl; hg. Capital gains are taxed with constant
tax rate  g. Again, a fraction sE of total tax revenue is devoted to publicly nancing
education on behalf of type h individuals and a fraction sT nances transfers on behalf
of type l individuals.
5 Equilibrium Analysis
This section derives important analytical results. In section 6, we will examine whether
the calibrated model implies su¢ ciently strong trickle-down e¤ects of an increase in
education expenditure which eventually benets the less fortunate better than extend-
ing redistribution. In addition to the evolution of net income of low-ability dynasties,
we also consider that of their wage rate. In section 7, we study the dynamic e¤ects of
policy reforms on relative earnings and relative net income between the two types of
individuals.
5.1 Preliminaries
The equilibrium denition is standard and relegated to the appendix. It turns out
that, for the transversality conditions of household optimization problems to hold and
intertemporal welfare levels Uh and Ul to be nite, we have to restrict the parameter
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space such that
  n+ (   1)g > 0 with g  n(1  )
1   : (A1)
As will become apparent, g is the long run growth rate of individual consumption
levels, individual income components, and knowledge measures AH , AL. Thus, in
the long run, technological change turns out to be unbiased. In modern times and
advanced economies, on average, the per capita income growth rate exceeds the popu-
lation growth rate (g > n), implying
 > : (A2)
Prot maximization of non-R&D producers implies two intermediate results which
relate to the previous literature, reminding us on the mechanics of directed technical
change.
Lemma 1. Dene   + "(1  ). The relative wage per unit of human capital
between type h and type l individuals reads as
wh
wl
=

HX
LX
  1
 

AH
AL
  1
 
: (14)
All proofs are relegated to the appendix. According to (14),  is the "derived"
elasticity between high-skilled and low-skilled labor in production (Acemoglu, 2002).
That is, for given productivity levels, an increase in relative amount of type h human
capital devoted to manufacturing, HX=LX , by one percent reduces the relative wage
rate, wh=wl, by 1= percent. Notably, if " > 1, then " >  > 1; if " < 1, then
" <  < 1.
Let PXH and P
X
L denote the price of the high-skilled intensive and low-skilled in-
tensive composite intermediate good used in the nal goods sector, respectively. An
increase in the relative knowledge stock of the high-skilled intensive sector, AH=AL,
has two counteracting e¤ects on relative wage rate as given by (14). First, the relative
productivity of type h human capital in the production of composite intermediates
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rises, wh=wl increases for a given relative price of intermediates, P  PXH =PXL . Second,
however, since relatively more of the high-skilled intensive composite good is produced
when AH=AL rises, the relative price of composite goods, P , decreases for given labor
inputs. Through this e¤ect, the relative value of the marginal product of type h hu-
man capital declines. If and only if the elasticity of substitution between the composite
intermediates is su¢ ciently high, " >  > 1, the rst e¤ect dominates the second one
(vice versa if " <  < 1).
The next result provides insights on relative R&D incentives in the two R&D sectors.
The respective prots of an intermediate good rms (symmetric within sectors) are
denoted by H and L.
Lemma 2. The relative instantaneous prot of machine producers reads as
H
L
=

AH
AL
  1
 

HX
LX
  1
 
: (15)
There are counteracting e¤ects of an increase in relative employment in composite
input production, HX=LX , on relative R&D incentives. First, for a given relative price
of the high-skilled intensive good, P , relative prots in the high-skilled intensive sector
rise ("market size e¤ect"). Second, however, P falls in response to an increase in
relative output of the high-skilled intensive good ("price e¤ect"). In the case where
" >  > 1, the rst e¤ect dominates the second one, and vice versa if " <  < 1.
Moreover, as already discussed after Lemma 1, an increase in the relative knowledge
stock of the high-skilled intensive sector, AH=AL, reduces the relative price P . Thus,
relative prots H=L decline. The magnitude of the elasticity of H=L with respect
to AH=AL is inversely related to the "derived" elasticity between high-skilled and low-
skilled labor in production,  .
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5.2 Balanced Growth Equilibrium
It turns out that restricting focus on the case in which the derived elasticity of substi-
tution is bounded upwards,
  2    
1   ; (A3)
is su¢ cient for existence and uniqueness of a balanced growth equilibrium. We focus
on this case throughout. The balanced growth equilibrium is characterized by
Proposition 1. Under (A1)-(A3), there exists a unique balanced growth equilib-
rium which can be characterized as follows:
(i) ch, cl, ah, al, AH , AL, wh, wl, T grow with rate g;
(ii) LX , HX , HAH , H
A
L , P
A
H , P
A
L grow with rate n;
(iii) XH , XL grow with rate g + n;
(iv) r, PXH , P
X
L , h, u are stationary;
(v) the fraction of time a type h individual participates in the labor market is
independent of policy parameters and reads as
u =
  n+ (   1)g + (1  )H
  n+ (   1)g + (1   + )H  u
; (16)
(vi) the human capital level per type h individual is increasing in the fraction of
human capital devoted to publicly nanced teaching, #, and independent of other policy
parameters; it reads as
h =

(1  u)#
H
 1
1  
 h: (17)
According to (5), Proposition 1 implies that also per capita income grows at rate
g in steady state. The result parallels the well-known property of semi-endogenous
growth models that the economys growth rate is policy-independent (e.g. Jones, 1995,
2005). Interestingly, taxation and public education policy have no e¤ect on the time
allocation of type h individuals (part (v) of Proposition 1). This is true even during the
transition to the steady state (not shown). These result are implications of assuming
time-invariant policy instruments and dynastic households.
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An increase in the fraction of human capital demanded by the government for
educating type h individuals, # = hE=h (triggered by an increase in tax revenue share
sE), raises the long run supply of human capital (part (v) of Proposition 1). However,
if # were too high, public education expansion could lower the supply of human capital
to private rms per type h individual, S  (uh   hE). The next result provides us
with a condition ruling out this implausible outcome for the long run.
Corollary 1. The long run supply of human capital per type-h individual, S 
(u   #)h, is increasing in # if and only if
# <
u
1   : (A4)
Finally, in line with empirical estimates suggesting that the elasticity of substitution
between high-skilled and low-skilled labor is larger than one (Johnson, 1997), we focus
on the case where
 > 1: (A5)
The subsequent propositions 2 and 3 show the e¤ects of changes in tax revenue
shares sE and sT on the steady state wage rate (and wage income) of type l individuals,
wl , and on the relative wage per unit of human capital between type h and type l
individuals in steady state, wh=w

l .
Proposition 2. Under (A1)-(A5), the wage rate of type l individuals in the long
run, wl , is increasing in s
E (or #), and independent of sT .
First, recall from (17) that an increase in # raises the long run level of human
capital per type h individual, h. Under (A4), in the long run, the amount of human
capital devoted to production, HX , thus rises, in turn raising the output level of the
human capital intensive composite income, XH . For given knowledge stocks, because
of the complementarity of composite inputs in nal goods production, this raises the
price of the low-skilled labor intensive composite input, PXL . Moreover, as discussed
after Lemma 2, for  > 1 (assumption (A5)), the "market size e¤ect" of an increase
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in HX=LX on relative prots for high-skilled intensive production, H=L, dominates
the "price e¤ect". Thus, an increase in # spurs innovation directed to type h human
capital relatively more, i.e. AH=AL rises. As this also raises relative output XH=XL
of the composite goods, PXL increases also through this e¤ect. As a result, the value
of the marginal product of low-skilled labor unambiguously increases in response to
expanding education. Second, an increase in sT , which nances the transfer to type l
individuals, is neutral with respect to the allocation of human capital, therefore leaving
wl una¤ected.
Proposition 3. Under (A1)-(A5), the following holds for the relative wage per
unit of human capital between type h and type l individuals in the long run, wh=wl .
(i) If  = 2  
1  (i.e., (A3) holds with equality), w

h=w

l is independent of s
E (or
#); otherwise (if  < 2  
1  ), w

h=w

l is decreasing in #,
(ii) wh=w

l is independent of s
T .
Consider an (endogenous) increase in the type h human capital for the production
of composite inputs, raising HX=LX in long run equilibrium. As in models with an
exogenous educational composition of the workforce, an increase in HX=LX could be
triggered by an increase in the supply of skilled labor. As suggested by the discussion
of Proposition 2, an increase in HX=LX could be driven by a higher fraction of human
capital demanded by the government for teaching, #. Also recall that, for  > 1,
an increase in HX=LX spurs innovation directed to type h human capital relatively
more, thus raising AH=AL. According to Lemma 1, for  > 1, an increase in the
"relative knowledge stock", AH=AL, would raise the relative wage rate per unit of
type h human capital, wh=wl, for given HX=LX . However, under limited (derived)
substitutability between type h and type l labor,  , as assumed in (A3), the e¤ect is
not large enough to overturn the negative impact of an increase ofHX=LX (as triggered
by a higher fraction of human capital demanded by the government for teaching, #)
on wh=wl for a given relative knowledge stock, AH=AL (see (14) in Lemma 1). If (A3)
holds with equality, both e¤ects exactly cancel.
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6 Trickle Down Dynamics
Like in section 3, we examine the dynamic implications of two policy experiments on
net income of type l individuals, i.e. an increase in the share of the total tax revenue
devoted to publicly nanced higher education, sE, versus an equally sized increase in
the share of the total tax revenue devoted to redistributive transfers, sT . Moreover, we
discuss our conclusions in several respects.
To this end, we apply the relaxation algorithm (Trimborn, Koch and Steger, 2008)
which is designed to deal with highly-dimensional and non-linear di¤erential-algebraic
equation systems. A favorable feature of the relaxation algorithm is that it does not
rely on linearization of the underlying dynamic system. As we focus on potentially large
policy shocks and long term macroeconomic dynamics, the initial deviation from the
nal steady state may be quite large. The di¤erential-algebraic system is summarized
in the online-appendix.
6.1 Sketch of the Calibration Strategy
The details of the calibration strategy are laid out in the appendix. Importantly, we
view a type l individual as representative for high school drop-outs and a type h
individual as representing an "average" educated worker. The parameter values are
based on observables for the US economy in the 2000s before the nancial crisis 2007-
2009 (including policy parameters), assuming that the US was in steady state initially
(i.e. before the considered policy shocks). Some parameters   the economys growth
rate (g), the population growth rate (n), the mark-up factor (), the elasticity of
substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor ( )  are observed directly. The
other parameters are matched to endogenous observables like the full-time equivalent of
relative wage income of the di¤erent types of workers ("skill premium" 
  whh=wl),
the fraction of time which type h individuals supply to the labor market (u), the
capital-output ratio (K=Y ) and the interest rate (r). It turns out that the steady state
values of individual asset holdings depends on its initial distribution. We therefore also
calibrate the relative amount of asset holdings between the two types of households
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initially, ah;0=al;0.
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value
n 0:01  0:4  g 0:1
g 0:02 " 1:83  l 0:17
 1:5 K 0:04 h 0:35
 0:5 H 0:03  r 0:17
 0:75  1:3 sE 0:1
 0:02  0:25 sT 0:07
r 0:07  0:35 # 0:04
 1:91  0:25 l 0:15
 0:2  0:15 ah;0=al;0 5
Table 1: Baseline set of parameters.
6.2 Expanding Education versus Extending Redistribution
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Figure 1: Time path of normalized income, yl=yl , in three scenarios: solid (blue) line:
baseline scenario (sT and sE remain constant), horizontal dashed line: sT increases by ve
percentage points), increasing dashed line: sE increases by ve percentage points.
Parameter values as in Table 1.
In Figure 1, like for the simple model, we comparatively consider the e¤ects of an
increase in sE and sT by ve percentage points on normalized net income of type l
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individuals, yl=yl , where superscript (*) again denotes initial steady state values. On
impact, again, expanding education hurts the poor, whereas enhancing redistribution
favors the poor, as compared to the baseline scenario. An increase in sE diverts human
capital (complementary to the type l workers) from manufacturing activity on im-
pact (decrease in HX) whereas increasing transfers leaves the human capital allocation
una¤ected. After about 11 years, net income of low-skilled workers in the scenario
"education expansion" is equated with that in the baseline scenario. Eventually, un-
like in panel (a) but like in panel (b) of Figure 0 displaying policy responses for the
simple model, growth trickles down to the poor and makes them better o¤ than under
a "redistribution extension". (The mechanisms are discussed in detail in the next sub-
section.) Denote by t^ the time span (to be interpreted as the number of years) after
a policy reform in t = 0 such that net income of low-skilled workers in the scenario
"education expansion" is the same as in the scenario "redistribution extension" (and
higher for t > t^). Figure 1 suggests that, in the US, t^ = 97.
6.3 Decomposing the E¤ects of Expanding Education
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Figure 2: The time path of normalized income, yl=yl , and its additive components when s
E
increases by ve percentage points. Parameter values as in Table 1.
To gain more insights on why the poor are better o¤ in the short run under ex-
tending redistributive transfers but are better o¤ in the long run in case of expanding
education, and to better understand the dynamic general equilibrium interactions, we
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consider a decomposition of normalized net income of a type l household in its additive
components:
yl
yl
=
(1   l)wl
yl
+
[(1   r)r   n] al
yl
+
T
yl
: (18)
Assuming again that sE is being increased from sE = 0:1 to sE = 0:15, Figure 2
displays the dynamic evolution of the three additive components as given by the right-
hand side of (18), i.e. wage income net of taxes, (1   l)wl, capital income net of taxes,
[(1   r)r   n] al, and redistributive transfer, T , relative to total net income of a type l
household in the long run, yl . Apparently, the composition of income changes only
slightly along the transition. Wage growth for type l workers and increased transfer
income (which is driven by general economic growth) allows accumulation of assets.
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Figure 3: The time path of the normalized wage rate, wl=wl , and its multiplicative
components when sE increases by ve percentage points. Parameter values as in Table 1.
It is apparent that the wage component dominates the other components. Thus,
we decompose the wage component further. The solid (red) curve in Figure 3 displays
the evolution of normalized wage income as given by13
wl
wl
=
PXL
PXL
AL
AL

xL
xL

. (19)
13The wage rate (value of the marginal product) of low-ability workers may, under within-group
symmetry of machine producers, be expressed as wl = PXL (1  ) (LX) AL (xL) (see (27) as
derived in appendix).
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It is driven by the three factors on the right-hand side of (19). Their evolution in
response to an increase in sE mirrors central human capital reallocation e¤ects. First,
a high-ability household devotes more time to education, i.e. 1   u increases. This
implies a reduction in the total supply of skilled labor, Nhuh, on impact. Second,
an increase in sE allocates more skilled workers to the education sector (increase in
teaching input hE). Thus, skilled labor must be initially withdrawn from production of
the human capital intensive good and from R&D. After the initial shock, total supply
of skilled labor, Nhuh, increases because of human capital accumulation. The increased
supply is then allocated to all uses of human capital during the transition.
As a consequence, normalized wage income drops downwards initially - the solid
(red) curve starts below unity - and then starts to increase monotonically. The initial
drop of wl is driven by two opposing forces. First, the price of the low-skilled labor
intensive composite (XL ) input, PXL , drops on impact in response to a reallocation
of human capital away from manufacturing. Second, the quantity of machines in this
sector, with output xL for all machine producers, goes up on impact despite the as-
sociated downward jump of price PXL . This initial response reects the e¤ect on the
interest rate r (not shown), which declines on impact, in turn reducing marginal costs
of machine producers. As human capital accumulates, there is a monotonic increase of
PXL in the aftermath of the initial drop. As discussed after Proposition 2 for the long
run, an increase in the amount of human capital used in production, HX , leads to a
higher level of the human capital intensive input, XH . This pushes up the marginal
product of the low-skilled intensive composite input, therefore raising PXL eventually.
Moreover, in the rst phase of the transition process after an increase in sE, less R&D
(directed to type l workers) is undertaken because of the reallocation of human capital
towards educational production. A decrease in HAL depresses in turn the knowledge
stock component AL, as visualized by the downward sloping branch of the (green) dot-
ted curve. However, eventually, as more human capital becomes available, more R&D
is being undertaken than initially, which eventually also benets low-skilled workers.
Finally, the component (xL=xL)
 also follows a U-shaped evolution, partly driven by a
similar evolution of AL=AL. The accumulation of machines in the low-skilled intensive
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sector is eventually fostered, as more machine types become available (AL goes up)
and as the low-skilled intensive good becomes more expensive (PXL rises).
In sum, the wage rate of low-skilled workers wl and therefore net income yl increase
in the longer run in response to (i) rising prices of those goods that are produced low-
skilled labor intensively (PXL ), (ii) a more sophisticated state of technology due to more
R&D targeted at the sector producing the low-skilled labor intensive input (raising AL),
and (iii) an accelerated accumulation of capital goods that are complementary to low-
skilled labor (xL). All of these mechanisms are fueled by the evolution of the supply
and allocation of human capital over time.
6.4 Discussion
We now discuss the trickle-down dynamics by sensitivity analysis, by looking at con-
sumption rather than income, and by examining alternative ways to change public
expenditure for educational and redistributive purposes. To save space, the graphs sup-
porting the following arguments and extended discussions are relegated to the online-
appendix.
First, in addition to the extent and direction of endogenous technical change, we
suspect the trickle-down growth mechanisms to critically depend on the (derived) elas-
ticity of substitution between the two types of labor.
How does a change in  a¤ect the time span t^ after which type l workers are
better o¤ if the government enhances public education (increasing sE) compared to
an increase in social transfers (increasing sT )? For a derived elasticity of substitution,
 = 1:4 (thus " = 1:67 instead of " = 1:83), type l individuals are better o¤ from
expanding education earlier than for the baseline calibration; we nd that the threshold
time span is t^ = 71 (whereas t^ = 97 for  = 1:5). The reason is simple: if both types of
workers are better complements, type l individuals benet more from human capital
accumulation. In the case where  = 1:6 (i.e. " = 2), t^ rises to 147 years. Further
sensitivity analysis shows that the threshold time span t^ exists for reasonably high
elasticities of substitution and is increasing in  throughout; t^ is convex for low values
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and concave for high values of  (see Figure A.1 in online-appendix).
Second, we may ask if the dynamic e¤ects on the consumption level of type l
individuals, cl, eventually determining their welfare, is similar to the dynamic e¤ects
on net income, yl. This is indeed the case (see Figure A.2). The initial drop in
response to an increase in sE is somewhat less pronounced, which reects consumption
smoothing. In the longer run, type l households eventually gain more from in increase
in sE than in sT also in terms of consumption.
Third, so far we have focussed on an evaluation of changing sE and sT separately,
necessarily being associated with a decrease in the government expenditure share of a
third spending category. We may alternatively consider an increase (decrease) in the
fraction of total tax revenue devoted to education while at the same time reducing
(raising) the fraction devoted to transfers such that the sum of the two fractions,
sE + sT , remains constant. We nd that, again, a policy reform towards expanding
education is harmful in the shorter run and improves situation of type l individuals
in the longer run (see Figure A.3). Moreover, extending redistribution at the expense
of education expenditure is benecial in the shorter run but lowers yl in the longer run
even compared to the baseline scenario without policy reform.
Fourth, so far we have left the tax rates constant and focussed on a change in
government expenditure shares, sE and sT . What happens if we increase tax rates to
nance an increase in education expenditure or redistributive transfers? For instance,
suppose we increase the tax rate on bond holdings,  r, to nance an increase in transfer
T , while holding constant the government expenditure share on transfers, sT . The
fraction of human capital devoted to higher education, # = hE=h is unchanged as well.
Such a policy reform benets type l households on impact but soon becomes harmful
even compared to the the baseline scenario without policy reform (see Figure A.4). The
reason is the distortion of capital income taxation on savings and R&D investments
by which higher transfers are nanced. The fraction of human capital devoted to both
kinds of R&D declines, eventually depressing net income yl. Alternatively, we may
nance an increase in # by an increase in  r, while holding the education expenditure
share sE constant. As we start in long run equilibrium, transfers initially grow at
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rate g. We thus x the growth-adjusted transfer ~T  Te gt at its initial level for
this policy experiment. We nd that type l households lose on impact because of
the reallocation of human capital towards educational production (also displayed in
Figure A.4). During the further transition, the distortion of R&D investments causes
a further decline in yl. Comparing both policies, again, expanding education is better
in the longer run and worse in the shorter run than extending redistribution.
Fifth, examining a similar comparative policy evaluation to the previous one by
raising the labor income tax rate of type h individuals, h, instead of  r, suggests
qualitatively similar dynamic e¤ects than displayed in Figure 1 (see Figure A.5).
7 Inequality Dynamics
Wenally discuss the dynamic implications of policy reforms on inequality. We consider
the evolution of both the skill premium, 
 = whh=wl, and the relative net income
between the two types of workers, yh=yl, again in response to rasing sE and sT by ve
percentage points.
7.1 Skill Premium
In Figure 4, the solid (blue) line displays the skill premium in the baseline scenario and
the dashed (red) line shows its evolution in response to an increase in sE. (The skill
premium is una¤ected by an increase in sT .) Figure 4 demonstrates that expanding
education raises earnings inequality in the short run as well as in the long run. The
initial jump is driven by several reallocation e¤ects discussed above which reduce em-
ployment in the human capital intensive production sector. The drop in HX impacts
directly on the relative wage rate, wh=wl, see (14). Thus, the relative wage rate jumps
upwards. Along the transition, the increase in earnings inequality is mainly driven by
an increase in the level of human capital per type h household, h, i.e. by an increase
in human capital inequality across individuals.14 In the long run, 
 is increased exclu-
14In the US average years of schooling increased steadily over the period 1880 to 1980 (Goldin
and Katz, 2007, Figure 7). Rising human capital inequality as an explanation of an increasing skill
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sively because of an increase in h, under the presumption of part (i) of Proposition 3,
which applies for our preferred calibration.
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Figure 4: Time path of the skill premium 
 = whh=wl. Solid (blue) line: baseline scenario,
and increase in sT , increasing dashed line: sE increases by ve percentage points.
Parameter values as in Table 1.
7.2 Income Inequality
Does rising earnings inequality in response to an expansion of education imply that also
inequality of net income rises over time? At the rst glance, given that also initial asset
holdings are higher for type h individuals (ah;0 > al;0) and the long run interest rate
is rather high for the calibration in Table 1 (particularly, r > g), we may suspect that
this is the case. Interestingly, however, Figure 5 suggests that these conditions are not
su¢ cient for relative net income between the two groups of households, yh=yl, to rise
during the entire transition in response to an increase in sE. Earlier in the transition
yh=yl indeed rises, reecting a rising skill premium over time. However, it turns out
that type l individuals choose their consumption path such that they accumulate
assets faster than type h individuals during the entire transition (not shown); that
is, _al=al > _ah=ah. The implied (although less than full) convergence of asset holdings
eventually drives down inequality of net income even below the initial level without
premium does not, in contrast to Acemoglu (2002), require the (derived) elasticity of skilled labor and
unskilled labor,  , to be larger than 2.
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policy reform! An increase in the fraction of tax revenue for redistributive transfers, sT ,
drives down income inequality more substantially, however. Noteworthy and consistent
with empirical evidence, in our calibrated model, the rich choose a higher savings rate
(not shown), i.e. _al=yl < _ah=yh.
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Figure 5: Time path of relative net income, yh=yl. Solid (blue) line: baseline scenario,
increasing dashed line: sT increases by ve percentage points, increasing dashed line: sE
increases by ve percentage points. Parameter values as in Table 1.
7.3 Discussion
Comparing the e¤ects of the two considered policy options on income inequality, dis-
played in Figure 5, suggests an equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤. The dynamic, inverted U-
shaped e¤ect of expanding education, suggested by Figure 5, reminds us on the famous
Kuznets curve and is intriguing in itself. It contributes to the recent debate, greatly
popularized by Piketty (2014), on the past and future evolution of income inequality.
Our analysis suggests that income inequality may eventually go down. The result is
surprising to the extent that our setup is favorable for income inequality to rise over
time in response to expanding education: it features divergence in earnings with higher
earnings growth rates for the initially wealthy during the entire transition. Moreover,
our analysis is consistent with the evidence by Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman
(2014) that r > g prevails most of the time in history. Nevertheless, we have shown
that these features do not allow us to draw strong conclusions on the future evolution
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of the income distribution, unlike suggested by Piketty (2014). It is interesting that the
decline in inequality is not just a theoretical possibility but predicted by our preferred
calibration to the US economy.
8 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to understand whether and, if yes, when economic growth
caused by an increase in public education expenditure on behalf of high-ability indi-
viduals trickles down to the least educated. We contrasted the dynamic e¤ects of that
kind of education expansion with those of an equally sized increase in redistributive
transfers. In our dynamic general equilibrium model, public expenditures are nanced
by various distortionary income taxes, human capital accumulation is endogenous, and
R&D-based technical change could be directed to complement either high-skilled or
low-skilled labor. In the shorter run, the poor are better o¤ from an increase in the
fraction of government spending devoted to redistributive transfers and lose from ex-
panding education. Consistent with empirical evidence for the US from the 1970s
onwards, our analysis suggests that human capital accumulation is accompanied by
falling or stagnating earnings of low-skilled individuals early in the transition phase
and rising skill premia. In the longer run, however, our model predicts that low-ability
workers eventually benet more from promoting education of high-ability workers. The
time span for this to happen critically depends on the elasticity of substitution between
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. The higher this elasticity is, the faster the poor
benet from expanding education. The trickle-down e¤ect is driven by an eventual
increase in the level of human capital devoted towards R&D in the sector producing
low-skilled intensive goods.
Moreover, our analysis suggests that expanding education on behalf of high-ability
workers triggers an inverted U-shaped evolution of income inequality. The result is
remarkable in view of the prediction of a considerable and sustained increase in the
skill premium, the assumption that low-ability households start with lower initial asset
holdings, and an interest rate which exceeds the long run growth rate of earnings
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(r > g). However, redistributive transfers are more successful in reducing inequality of
net income compared to extending public education nance.
In sum, we identied two kinds of trade-o¤s regarding the alternative policies we
consider which are potentially informative for the recent policy debate on income in-
equality. First, there is a dynamic trade-o¤with respect to absolute income of the poor.
In the shorter run, low-ability households would always prefer higher transfers. If the
goal of policy makers is, however, to improve absolute living standards of these house-
holds in the longer run, promoting education of high-ability workers is more promising.
Second, there is a long run trade-o¤ between the goal of raising living standards of the
poor and reducing income inequality. Although both policy measures we considered
lead to an eventual decline of net income dispersion, redistributive transfers are more
successful in this respect.
These complex trade-o¤s call for a careful normative analysis which is left for future
research. It also appears valuable to check robustness of our results in an alternative
framework which highlights intergenerational conicts resulting from the kind of policy
trade-o¤s suggested by our analysis.
Appendix
Denition of Equilibrium (comprehensive model). Let PXH and P
X
L denote the
price of the high-skilled intensive and low-skilled intensive composite intermediate good
used in the nal goods sector, respectively, and pH(i), pL(i) the prices of machine i in
the respective composite input sector. Moreover, let PAH and P
A
L denote the present
discounted value of the prot stream generated by an innovation in the low-skilled
and high-skilled intensive sector, respectively. These are equal to equity prices. The
exclusion of arbitrage possibilities in the nancial market implies that the after-tax
returns from equity (capital gains and dividends) in both sectors and bonds and must
be equal; that is,
(1   g)
_PAH
PAH
+ (1   r)H
PAH
= (1   g)
_PAL
PAL
+ (1   r) L
PAL
= (1   r)r: (20)
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For given policy parameters ( g;  r; h;  l; sE; sT ), an equilibrium consists of time paths
for quantities

HXt ; L
X
t ; H
A
Ht;
HALt; ht; ut; h
E; XHt; XLt; fxHt(i)gi2[0;AHt] ; fxLt(i)gi2[0;ALt]; AHt; ALt; cht; clt; aht; alt; Ttg
and prices fPXHt; PXLt; fpHt(i)gi2[0;AHt] ; fpLt(i)gi2[0;ALt]; PAHt; PALt; wht; wlt; rtg such that
1. R&D rms and producers of the nal good, the composite intermediate goods,
and machines maximize prots;15
2. type h households maximize utility Uh s.t. (2) and (12); type l households
maximize Ul s.t. (13);16
3. the no-arbitrage conditions (20) in the nancial market hold;
4. the total value of assets (owned by households) fullls
Nhah +Nlal = K + P
A
HAH + P
A
L AL; (21)
where K is given by (8).
5. the labor markets for typeh and typel workers clear:
HX +HAH +H
A
L +Nhh
E = Nhuh; (22)
LX = Nl: (23)
6. The government budgets for transfers to type l individuals (T ) and education
(human capital devoted to education of type h individuals, as fraction # of the total)
are balanced each period.
Proof of Lemma 1. According to (5), inverse demand functions in the composite
input sectors are given by
PXH =
@Y
@XH
=

Y
XH
 1
"
; PXL =
@Y
@XL
=

Y
XL
 1
"
: (24)
15Condition 1 implies that the composite intermediate goods markets and the market for machines
clear.
16Households also observe standard non-negativity constraints which lead to transversality condi-
tions (see the proof of Proposition 1).
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Thus, relative intermediate goods demand is given by
XH
XL
=

PXH
PXL
 "
(25)
According to (7), the inverse demand for machine i in the human capital intensive
sector is pH(i) = PXH (H
X=xH(i))
 1. Machine producers, being able to transform
one unit of the nal good to one unit of output, have marginal production costs equal
to the sum of the interest rate and the capital depreciation rate, r+ K . In absence of
a competitive fringe, the incumbents prot-maximizing price would be (r+ K)=. A
price equal to (r + K) (the marginal cost of the competitive fringe) is the maximal
price, however, a producer can set without losing the entire demand. Since   1=,
it is also the optimal price. Thus, with pH(i) = pL(i) = (r + K) for all i,
xH(i) = xH =

PXH
(r + K)
 1
1 
HX
(6)
=) XH = AHHX

PXH
(r + K)
 
1 
; (26)
xL(i) = xL =

PXL
(r + K)
 1
1 
LX
(7)
=) XL = ALLX

PXL
(r + K)
 
1 
; (27)
Hence, relative supply of composite inputs is
XH
XL
=
AHH
X
ALLX

PXH
PXL
 
1 
: (28)
Equating the right-hand sides of (25) and (28) and using  = + "(1 ) leads to
an expression for the relative price of the composite inputs,
P  P
X
H
PXL
=

AHH
X
ALLX
  1 
 
; (29)
which is inversely related to the relative "e¢ ciency units" of high-skilled to low-skilled
labor in production activities, AHH
X
ALLX
.
According to (6) and (7), wage rates per unit of high-skilled and low-skilled labor are
given by wh = PXH (1  )XH=HX and wl = PXL (1  )XL=LX , respectively. Dividing
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both equations and using both (28) and (29) conrms (14). 
Proof of Lemma 2: According to (26) and (27), the instantaneous prots of
machine producers, H = (  1)(r + K)xH and L = (  1)(r + K)xL, read as
H = (  1)


PXH
 1
1 
(r + K)
  
1 HX ; (30)
L = (  1)


PXL
 1
1 
(r + K)
  
1 LX : (31)
Dividing both expressions, substituting (29) and noting from the denition of  that

1  =
"  
  1 conrms (15). 
Proof of Proposition 1: First, we dene lX  LX=Nh, hX  HX=Nh. We also
dene hAk  HAk =Nh, pAk  PAk =Nh, k 2 fH;Lg. With these denitions as well as
expressions Nl=Nh = l and hE = #h from (3) we can rewrite labor market clearing
conditions (22) and (23) as
hX + hAH + h
A
L = (u  #)h; (32)
lX = l: (33)
Moreover, let ~zt  zte gt for z 2 fT; ch; cl; ah; al; wh; wl; Ah; Alg. That is, if a variable
z grows with rate g in the long run, then ~z is stationary. Combining (8) and (21) and
substituting both (26) and (27), we then have
~ah + l~al = ~AH


(r + K)
PXH
 1
1 
hX +
~AL


(r + K)
PXL
 1
1 
l + pAH ~AH + p
A
L
~AL: (34)
The representative R&D rm which directs R&D e¤ort to the human capital intensive
sector maximizes
PAH
_AH   whHAH = PAH ~H(AH)HAH   whHAH ; (35)
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taking AH and ~H as given. Analogously for the R&D sector targeted to machines
which are complementary to low-skilled labor. Thus, using (9) and (10), we have
PAH (AH)
 (HAH)
  = PAL  (AL)
 (HAL )
  = wh: (36)
From (36) we can write
pAH

~AH
 1
(hAH)
  =
~wh
~AH
; (37)
pAL

~AL
 1
(hAL)
  =
~wh
~AL
: (38)
We turn next to composite input prices. Combining (24) with (5) implies
PXH =
"
1 +

XH
XL
  " 1
"
# 1
" 1
; (39)
PXL =
"
1 +

XH
XL
 " 1
"
# 1
" 1
: (40)
Substituting (29) into (25) we nd
XH
XL
=

AHH
X
ALLX
 "(1 )
"(1 )+
: (41)
Substituting (41) into (39) and (40), and using AH=AL = ~AH= ~AL, HX=LX = hX=l and
 = "(1  ) + , we obtain
PXH =
241 + ~AHhX
~ALl
!   1
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1
" 1
; (42)
PXL =
241 + ~AHhX
~ALl
!  1
 
35
1
" 1
: (43)
The current-value Hamiltonian which corresponds to the optimization problem of
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a type h household (see Denition 1) is given by
Hh = (ch)
1    1
1   + 

(1  u)(hE)1 h   h	+
 f[(1   r)r   n] ah + (1  h)whuh  chg ; (44)
where  and  are multipliers (co-state variables) associated with constraints (2) and
(12), respectively. Necessary optimality conditions are @Hh 7=@ch = @H7h=@u = 0 (con-
trol variables), _ = ( n) @H7h=@h, _ = ( n) @H7h=@ah (state variables), and
the corresponding transversality conditions. Thus,
 = (ch)
  ; (45)
(1  u) 1(hE)h =  (1  h)whh; (46)
_

=   n   (1  u) (hE)h 1 + H   

(1  h)whu; (47)
_

=   (1   r)r; (48)
lim
t!1
te
 ( n)tht = 0; (49)
lim
t!1
te
 ( n)taht = 0: (50)
Di¤erentiating (45) with respect to time and using (48) together with the denition
of ~ch, we obtain Euler equation

~ch
~ch
=
(1   r)r   

  g: (51)
Next dene mt  te( 1)gt. Combining (45) and (46) we can then write by using
hE = #h and the denitions of ~ch and ~wh:
m(1  u) 1#h+ 1 = (~ch)  (1  h) ~wh; (52)
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whereas combining (46) and (47) and making use of (45) and (52),
_m
m
= H +   n+ (   1)g   [ (1  u) + u] (1  u) 1#h+ 1: (53)
Moreover, (12) can be written as

~ah
~ah
= (1   r)r   n+ (1  h) ~whuh
~ah
  ~ch
~ah
  g: (54)
For low-skilled types (who decide about their consumption prole only), we nd
analogously to (51) that

~cl
~cl
=
(1   r)r   

  g: (55)
By using (13) we also obtain

~al
~al
= (1   r)r   n+ (1   l) ~wl
~al
  ~cl
~al
+
~T
~al
  g: (56)
Using Ak = ~Akegt, HAk = Nhh
A
k , k 2 fH;Lg, as well as Nh;0 = 1 and g = (1 )n1  we
can also rewrite (9) and (10) as

~AH
~AH
= ( ~AH)
 1  hAH1    g; (57)

~AL
~AL
= ( ~AL)
 1(hAL)
1    g. (58)
Recall that competitive wage rates read as wh = PXH (1   )XH=HX and wl =
PXL (1   )XL=LX . Combining these expressions with (26) and (27), respectively, we
nd for adjusted wage rates:
~wh = (1  )


(r + K)
 
1 
~AH
 
PXH
 1
1  ; (59)
~wl = (1  )


(r + K)
 
1 
~AL
 
PXL
 1
1  : (60)
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Substituting (30) and (31) into (20) implies
_pAH + np
A
H =
1   r
1   g
0@rpAH   (  1)  PXH  11  hX
(r + K)

1 
1A ; (61)
_pAL + np
A
L =
1   r
1   g
0@rpAL   (  1)  PXL  11  lX
(r + K)

1 
1A : (62)
Combining (8) with (26) and (27) we can write
K = AH

PXH
(r + K)
 1
1 
HX + AL

PXL
(r + K)
 1
1 
LX : (63)
The total tax revenue (T T R) is the sum of the revenue from taxation of labor
income and returns to asset holding,
T T R = hNhwhuh+  lNlwl +  rrK +  g( _PAHAH + _PAL AL) +  r(HAH + LAL): (64)
Note that _PAH=Nh = _p
A
H +np
A
H and _P
A
L =Nh = _p
A
L +np
A
L , as given by the right-hand side
of (61) and (62), respectively. Thus, using lX = l from (33), (30), (31) and (63) in (64)
we obtain
  T T R
Nhegt
= h ~whuh+  l ~wll +
(1   r) g
1   g r(p
A
H
~AH + p
A
L
~AL) +
 r    g
1   g
(  1)  

 1
1 
(r + K)

1 
 
PXH
 1
1  hX ~AH +
 
PXL
 1
1  l ~AL

 rr
 
~AH

PXH
(r + K)
 1
1 
hX + ~AL

PXL
(r + K)
 1
1 
l
!
: (65)
The publicly nanced expenditure is given by whNhhE = sET T R. Thus, recalling
hE = #h, the fraction of tax revenue devoted to education, sE, and the human capital
share devoted to teaching, #, are related according to
# ~whh = s
E: (66)
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Similarly, the aggregate transfer payments read as NlT = sTT T R, implying that
~T =
sT
l
; (67)
The dynamical system, on which our numerical analysis is based, is given by (2), (32)-
(34), (37), (38), (42), (43), (51)-(62), (66) and (67), with  as given by (65).
To prove that a steady state with the properties stated in Proposition 1 exists, we
need to show that hAk , p
A
k , P
X
k , ~Ak (k 2 fH;Lg), lX , hX , u, h, ~T , ~cj, ~aj, ~wj (j 2 fl; hg),
r and m are stationary in the long run. To see this, we derive steady state values of
the just derived dynamical system in what follow. First, set _h=h = 0 and hE = #h in
(2) to nd (1  u)#h+ 1 = H , which can also be rewritten as
h =

(1  u)#
H
 1
1  
: (68)
Using (68) in (53) and setting _m = 0 conrms (16), consistent with part (v). Evaluating
(68) at u = u then gives us (17), conrming part (vi). Note that h is indeed time-
invariant (i.e., _h = 0 for t!1), according to (16).
Next, set

~ch = 0 in (51) to nd that
(1   r)r = + g: (69)
Thus, also

~cl = 0 holds, according to (55). Next, set

~AH =

~AL = 0 in (57) and (58) to
obtain
~AH =
 

 
hAH
1 
g
! 1
1 
; (70)
~AL =
 

 
hAL
1 
g
! 1
1 
; (71)
respectively, or ( ~Ak) 1 =
 
hAk
 1
g, k 2 fH;Lg. Using the latter together with (59)
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in (37) and (38) yields
pAH = (1  )


(r + K)
 
1   
PXH
 1
1  h
A
H
g
; (72)
pAL = (1  )


(r + K)
 
1   
PXH
 1
1  h
A
L
g
~AH
~AL
; (73)
respectively. Now substitute (69) and (72) into (61) and set _pAH = 0 to nd
hAH =  ( r;  g)h
X ; (74)
where
 ( r;  g) 
1  1

1

  1
(1   r)g
+ g   (1   g)n: (75)
Note that   > 0 under (A1). Similarly, substituting lX = l, (69) and (73) into (62)
and setting _pAL = 0 we obtain
hAL =
 ( r;  g)l
P
1
1  ~AH
~AL
: (76)
From (74) and (76) we get
hAH
hAL
=
~AH
~AL
hX
l
P
1
1  : (77)
Moreover, (70) and (71) imply that
~AH
~AL
=

hAH
hAL
 1 
1 
=

hX
l
P
1
1 
  1 
 
; (78)
where the latter equation follows after substituting (77).
Next, substitute AH=AL = ~AH= ~AL as given by (78) into (29), and use HX=LX =
hX=l to obtain
P
1
1  =

hX
l
  1 
1   ( )
: (79)
It is easy to show by recalling  < 1 that assumption (A3) implies 1   >  (  ).
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Substituting (78) into (76) and using both (79) and 
1  =
"  
  1 then leads to
hAL =  ( r;  g)
 
hX
% l1 %; where (80)
%  2     + (   1)
1      (  ) (81)
(thus 1  % = (  1)(1 )
1   ( )). According to assumption (A3), %  0.
The supply of human capital to private rms per type-h individual (the right-hand
side of ((32))) is, in the long run, given by
(u   #)h = (u   #)

(1  u)#
H
 1
1  
 S(#): (82)
Denote the long run value of hX by hX. Substituting (74) and (80) into labor
market clearing condition (32) implies that hX is implicitly dened by
[1 +  ( r;  g)]h
X = S(#)   ( r;  g)(hX)%l1 %: (83)
The left-hand side of (83) as a function of hX is an increasing line through the origin.
If % > 0, the right-hand side of (83) is monotonically decreasing in hX and goes to zero
as hX !1. If % = 0, it is a constant. Thus, whenever %  0, hX is unique.17
It is easy to check that (26), (27), (32), (42), (43), (51), (53), (54), (55), (56), (59),
(60), (65)-(74), (80) and (83) are consistent with parts (i)-(iv) of Proposition 1.
Finally, it remains to be shown that the transversality conditions (49) and (50)
hold under assumption (A1). Di¤erentiating (46) with respect to time and using that
_h = _u = 0 as well as _wh=wh = g for t ! 1 implies that, along a balanced growth
path, _= = _= + g. From (45) and _ch=ch = g for t ! 1 we nd _= =  g and
thus _= = (1  )g. As h becomes stationary, (49) holds i¤ limt!1 e[(1 )g+n ]t = 0,
i.e., i¤ (A1) holds. Similarly, using _= =  g and the fact that ah grows with rate g
in the long run, we nd that also (50) holds under (A1). The same holds analogously
17If % < 0, meaning that assumption (A3) is violated, the right-hand side of (83) is strictly increasing
and concave in hX , goes to  1 for hX ! 0 and to S(#) > 0 for hX !1. Thus, in this case, either
two solutions or no solution for hX as given by (83) exist.
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for the transversality condition associated with al. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Corollary 1. Follows from (82) and part (v) of Proposition 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First, it is useful to establish the following result.
Corollary A.1. Under (A1)-(A5), hX is increasing in # and independent of sT .
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem to (83) and observe Corollary 1.
Next, using (74) and (80) we have
HAH
HAL
=
hAH
hAL
=

hX
l
1 %
: (84)
Substituting (84) into ~AH= ~AL =
 
hAH=h
A
L
 1 
1  (recall (78)) and using 1 % = (  1)(1 )
1   ( ) ,
according to (81), we obtain
AH
AL
=
~AH
~AL
=

hX
l
 (  1)(1 )
1   ( )
: (85)
Substituting (43) and (71) into (60) and using 1   =   1
" 1 , we nd
~wl = (1  )


(r + K)
 
1 
 

 
hAL
1 
g
! 1
1 
 
1 +

hX
l
 1 
1   ( )
!
: (86)
In view of Corollary A.1, the result follows from (86) by using the expression for hAL as
given by (80) and recalling both %  0 and  < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Substituting HX=LX = hX=l and (85) into (14) we
obtain that
wh
wl
=

hX
l
 %
. (87)
The result is conrmed by recalling that " >  > 1 under assumption (A5), %  0
(where % = 0 if (A3) holds with equality),  < 1, and Corollary A.1. 
Calibration to the US Economy. We nally lay out how we derive the baseline
calibration summarized in Table 1.
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Consistent with average values for the period 1990-2006 (thereby averaging out
business cycle phenomena in the period before the nancial crisis started) from the
Penn World Tables (PWT) 7.1 (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2012), we let the long-
run average per capita income growth rate of the US economy, g, be equal to two
percent. The average annual population growth rate was about one percent, n = 0:01.
Thus, assuming that the US is in steady state, g = n(1 )
1  = 0:02 implies  = 2   1.
Assumption (A2),  > , is then equivalent to  < 1 and thus holds. Assuming an
intermediate value  = 0:5, we arrive at  = 0:75. Our main conclusions are robust to
variations in  and  which fulll  = 2  1.
In his survey about skill biased technological change, Johnson (1997) argues that
the elasticity of substitution between high-skilled and low-skilled labor is about 1.5. We
thus take value  = 1:5 for our baseline calibration. Note that  = 2  1 and  = 1:5
jointly imply that (A3) holds with equality. Thus, according to part (v) of Proposition
1 and part (i) of Proposition 3, the long run e¤ect of publicly nanced education
expansion (increase in #) on the college premium, 
  whh=wl , is unambiguously
positive.
Similar to Grossmann, Steger and Trimborn (2013), we use measures for the in-
vestment rate (sav) and the capital-output ratio to calibrate the depreciation rate of
physical capital, K . The investment rate is given by sav = ( _K + KK)=Y . Using
_K=K = n+ g and solving for K yields K = savK=Y   n  g. Averaging over the period
1990-2006, sav is equal to about 21 percent, according to PWT 7.1. For the capital-
output ratio, we take averages over the period 2002-2007 calculated from data of the
US Bureau of Economic Analysis. The capital stock is proxied by the amount of total
xed assets (private and public structures, equipment and software). At current prices,
this gives us K=Y = 3. Thus, the evidence suggests that K = 0:04, which is a stan-
dard value in the literature. For the mark-up factor on marginal costs of durable goods
producers, , we take a typical value from the empirical literature,  = 1:3 (Norrbin,
1993). For the output elasticity of capital goods, we choose  = 0:4. Our conclu-
sions are rather insensitive to alternative values in the typical range. With  = 1:5,
we obtain an the elasticity of substitution between the inputs in nal production of
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" =   
1  = 1:83.
We calibrate variables related to type h and type l individuals by values for the
"average" individual with at least high school diploma and high-school drop-outs, re-
spectively. According to OECD (2013), the share of those among the 25-64 year old
with less than upper secondary education in the year 2000 is 13 percent, suggesting
l = Nl;0=Nh;0 = 13=87 = 0:15. Initial asset holdings, ah;0, al;0, are calibrated as follows.
Survey data for the year 2007 suggests that households headed by someone without a
high school diploma (type l individuals) have, on average, a net worth of US$ 150,000
(in 2010 dollars). Moreover, the average asset holding of the other households (type h
individuals) is approximately US$ 750,000. We thus assume for initial asset holdings
that ah;0=al;0 = 5.18
For the tax rates, we take values from the 2000s prior to the nancial crisis 2007-
2009. As discussed in Grossmann, Steger and Trimborn (2010), the capital gains
tax rate should be set to  g = 0:1. Marginal labor income tax rates  l and h are
approximated by the US wage taxes in the 2000s for the ranges 20-40% and 200-
400% of average gross earnings, respectively; this gives us  l = 0:17 and h = 0:35.
Moreover, we assume  r = 0:17, which coincides with the US net personal capital
income tax (equal to the net top statutory rate to be paid at the shareholder level,
taking account of all types of reliefs and gross-up provisions at the shareholder level).
Given the discount rate, , and the long run interest rate, we can then derive a value
for  from the Keynes-Ramsey rule (which applies for individual consumption growth
rates, see appendix), g = (1 r)r 

. Using typical values  = 0:02 and r = 0:07 (Mehra
and Prescott, 1985), we nd  = 1:91.
The fractions of tax revenue devoted to education, sE, and redistributive transfers,
sT , are proxied by the recent shares of government spending to (higher) education and
social welfare, respectively. According to OECD (2011), all US government bodies
18Those headed by a college graduate possess about US$ 1,15 million, whereas those households
headed by high-school graduates and educated by some college possess about US$ 264,000 and
US$ 384,000, respectively. See http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/scf/scf_2010.htm. In the
2000s, about 40 percent of the 25-64 year olds in the US are tertiary-educated (OECD, 2013). Recall
that ah;0 and al;0 do not a¤ect the the long run allocation and level of human capital.
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combined spent 16.6 percent of its total expenditure on education in the year 2011.
Unlike in our model, not all education spending is non-basic, of course. We assume,
however, that the bulk of such welfare expenses benets the "representative" low-ability
individual;19 according to www.usgovernmentspending.com, spending on social welfare
in the 2000s is about 7-8 percent of total government spending. We set sE = 0:1
and sT = 0:07 in our baseline scenario and evaluate the e¤ects of changes in these
parameters. The implied fraction of human capital devoted to education of type h
individuals is about four percent (# = 0:04). Our main conclusions turn out to be
rather insensitive to the baseline set of policy parameters.
We conrmed that our results are rather insensitive to the congurations of para-
meters characterizing the educational production process, , H , , , , which match
the two observables u and 
. Like for the simple model, suppose  =  = 0:25
for input elasticities and  = 0:35 for the degree to which human capital is trans-
mitted over time. According to (17), parameter , capturing the productivity of the
educational production function, a¤ects the long run human capital level per type h
individual, h, independently of the long run fraction of time devoted to education,
1   u. It thus critically determines the long run skill premium, 
. The human
capital depreciation rate, H , also a¤ects the optimal (long run) time allocation of
type h individuals. The representative type h individual attends school about 5-
6 years out of 48 potential working years (between age 17 and 65), suggesting that
1   u = 0:14. Regarding the skill premium, we looked at the earnings distribution
for those aged 25+ with at least high school diploma and without high school diploma
(www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf). The relative median earnings between
the two groups is 1.9 and the relative earnings at the 90th percentile about 2.1. We
would like to measure relative average earnings to proxy 
 which are not available,
however. As the earnings dispersion is less pronounced within the group of high school
dropouts, we assume that the value for relative average earnings is higher than relative
median earnings. We set  = 0:15 and H = 0:03 to simultaneously match u = 0:86
and 
 = 2:1. Both values di¤er from those of the simple model; for Figure 0,  and H
19According to our set up, high-ability individuals do not receive transfers.
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matched u and 
 to that model.20 We took over for the simple model the other para-
meters (common to both models) from the comprehensive model. The human capital
depreciation rate is in the range of the estimated value in Heckman (1976), who nds
that H is between 0.7 and 4.7 percent.
Finally, R&D productivity parameter  is conrmed to play a minor role for the
important results of this paper and set to  = 0:2. Notably, the calibration implies a
long run R&D intensity of 3.1 percent in the US, which is a reasonable value.21
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Online-Appendix
1. Equilibrium Analysis of the Simple Model (Section 3)
Education choice: The Hamiltonian of the intertemporal decision problem of a
type h individual is given by
H = [(1  h)whuh]
1    1
1   + 

(1  u)(hE)1 h   Hh

; (88)
where  is the multiplier (co-state variable) associated with constraint (2). Necessary
optimality conditions are @H7h=@u = 0 (control variable) and _ =    @H7=@h (state
variable). Thus, using hE = #h,
 =
[(1  h)wh]1  h1   u 
(1  u) 1# ; (89)
_ = (+ H)  [(1  h)wh]1  u1 h     (1  u) #h+ 1: (90)
Substituting [(1  h)wh]1  = (1 u) 1#h++ 1u from (89) in (90), we have
_

= + H   #h+ 1(1  u) 1[u+ (1  u)]: (91)
Government budget conditions: Total tax revenue reads as hwhuh +  lwll.
Education expenditure whhE is a fraction sE of it; thus,
wh#h = s
E
 
hwhuh+  lwll

: (92)
Total transfer payments, Tl, are a fraction sT of total tax revenue; thus,
T =
sT
l
 
hwhu+  lwll

: (93)
Wage rates: Wage rates are given by the marginal productivity from the perspec-
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tive of a nal goods producer; according to (1),
wh = A
h
(HY )
  1
 + (LY )
  1
 
i 1
  1
(HY ) 
1
 
= h
"
1 +
 l
h(u  #)
  1
 
# 1
  1
; (94)
wl = A
h
(HY )
  1
 + (LY )
  1
 
i 1
  1
(LY ) 
1
 
= h
"
h(u  #)
l
  1
 
+ 1
# 1
  1
: (95)
Steady state education choice: According to (2) and hE = #h, in steady state
with _h = 0, we nd #h+ 1 = (1   u) . Using this in (91), setting _ = 0 and
solving for u, we nd that the long run fraction of time, u, allocated to production of
nal output is given by
u =
+ H(1  )
+ H(1 +    ) : (96)
u then determines the long run amount of human capital per type h individual,
h =

#(1  u)

 1
1  
: (97)
2. The Comprehensive Model
Di¤erential equations:
_h = (1  u)h   h; (98)

~ch
~ch
=
(1   r)r   

  g; (99)
_m
m
= H +   n+ (   1)g   [ (1  u) + u] (1  u) 1#h+ 1; (100)
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
~ah
~ah
= (1   r)r   n+ (1  h) ~whuh
~ah
  ~ch
~ah
  g; (101)

~cl
~cl
=
(1   r)r   

  g; (102)

~al
~al
= (1   r)r   n+ (1   l) ~wl
~al
  ~cl
~al
+
~T
~al
  g; (103)

~AH
~AH
= ( ~AH)
 1(hAH)
1    g; (104)

~AL
~AL
= ( ~AL)
 1(hAL)
1    g; (105)
_pAH =
1   r
1   g
0@rpAH   (  1)  PXH  11  hX
(r + K)

1 
1A  npAH ; (106)
_pAL =
1   r
1   g
0@rpAL   (  1)  PXL  11  lX
(r + K)

1 
1A  npAL : (107)
Algebraic equations:
~ah + l~al = ~AH

PXH
(r + K)
 1
1 
hX +
~AL

PXL
(r + K)
 1
1 
l + pAH
~AH + p
A
L
~AL; (108)
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PXH =
241 + ~AHhX
~ALlX
!   1
 
35
1
" 1
; (109)
PXL =
241 + ~AHhX
~ALlX
!  1
 
35
1
" 1
; (110)
m(1  u) 1#h+ 1 = (~ch)  (1  h) ~wh; (111)
~wh = (1  )


(r + K)
 
1 
~AH
 
PXH
 1
1  ; (112)
~wl = (1  )


(r + K)
 
1 
~AL
 
PXL
 1
1  ; (113)
pAH

~AH
 1
(hAH)
  =
~wh
~AH
; (114)
pAL

~AL
 1
(hAL)
  =
~wh
~AL
; (115)
hX + hAH + h
A
L = (u  #)h; (116)
lX = l: (117)
# ~whh = s
E (118)
~T =
sT
l
(119)
  TTR
Nhegt
= h ~whuh+  l ~wll +
(1   r) g
1   g r(p
A
H
~AH + p
A
L
~AL) +
 r    g
1   g
(  1)  

 1
1 
(r + K)

1 
 
PXH
 1
1  hX ~AH +
 
PXL
 1
1  l ~AL

+
 rr
 
~AH

PXH
(r + K)
 1
1 
hX + ~AL

PXL
(r + K)
 1
1 
l
!
: (120)
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Steady state values:
h =

(1  u)#
H
 1
1  
; (121)
where
u =
  n+ (   1)g + (1  )H
  n+ (   1)g + (1   + )H : (122)
The long run value of hX is implicitly dened by
0 = (1 +  )hX +  (hX)%l1 %   S; (123)
where
  =
1  1

1

  1
(1   r)g
+ g   (1   g)n; (124)
% =
2     + (   1)
1      (  ) ; (125)
S = (u  #)

(1  u)#
H
 1
1  
: (126)
Using hX we nd long run values of hAH and h
A
L :
hAH =  h
X ; (127)
hAL =  
 
hX
% l1 %: (128)
Setting

~AH =

~AL = 0 in (104) and (105) yields, by using the steady state values of
hAH , h
A
L , the steady state values of ~AH and ~AL:
~AH =
 

 
hAH
1 
g
! 1
1 
; (129)
~AL =
 

 
hAL
1 
g
! 1
1 
; (130)
Using the long run values of ~AH , ~AL, hX as well as lX = l in (109) and (110) gives
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us the long run values of PXH and P
X
L , respectively.
Setting

~ch = 0 (thus

~cl = 0) in (99), we obtain the steady state interest rate:
r =
+ g
1   r : (131)
Using the long run values for ~AH , ~AL, PXH , P
X
L and r in (112) and (113) give us the
long run values for ~wh and ~wl, respectively.
Using the long run values for ~AH , ~AL, hAH , h
A
L and ~wh in (114) and (115) give us
the long run values for pAH and p
A
L , respectively.
Using the long run values for h, u, ~wh, ~wl, ~AH , ~AL, PXH , P
X
L , p
A
H , p
A
L , h
X in (120)
we obtain  for policy parameters h,  l,  g,  r. Thus, using ~whh in (118) gives us the
relationship between # and sE; (119) gives us the relationship between ~T and sT .
Finally, setting

~ah =

~al = 0

in (101) and (103) implies
0 = (1   r)r   n+ (1  h) ~whuh
~ah
  ~ch
~ah
  g; (132)
0 = (1   r)r   n+ (1   l) ~wl
~al
  ~cl
~al
+
~T
~al
  g: (133)
Using the long run values of ~wh, ~wl, u, h, r, # and ~T , there are the four equations
(108), (111), (132), (133) left for the ve remaining unknown long run values of ~ch,
~cl, ~ah, ~al, and m. The numerical implementation suggests that the long run values of
these variables are unique under assumptions (A1)-(A5). Unlike the long run values of
other variables, however, the respective values depend on initial conditions. The initial
distribution of assets, characterized by initial conditions ah;0, al;0, cannot be chosen
independently of initial conditions AH;0 and AL;0. According to (108), in period 0, it
must hold that
ah;0 + lal;0 = AH;0
 
PXH;0
(r0 + K)
! 1
1 
hX +
AL;0
 
PXL;0
(r0 + K)
! 1
1 
l + pAH;0AH;0 + p
A
L;0AL;0: (134)
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Let s  ah;0=al;0 denote initial assets of h type individuals relative to those of l type
individuals. Thus, for given distributional parameter, s, initial assets read as
al;0 =
1
s+ l
0@AH;0 PXH;0
(r0 + K)
! 1
1 
hX+
AL;0
 
PXL;0
(r0 + K)
! 1
1 
l + pAH;0AH;0 + p
A
L;0AL;0
1A ; (135)
according to (134), and ah;0 = sal;0.
R&D intensity: The model is calibrated such that the long run R&D intensity is
two percent. The R&D intensity is given by
R&D  wh(H
A
H +H
A
L )
Y
: (136)
Substituting (26) and (27) into (5) we obtain
Y =


(r + K)
 
1 

ALL
X
 
PXL
 
1 
 " 1
"
+

AHH
X
 
PXH
 
1 
 " 1
"
 "
" 1
: (137)
Using the expression (112) for ~wh and (137) in (136) we nd
R&D =
(1  ) ~AH~AL
 
PXH
 1
1  (hAH + h
A
L)
lX (PXL )

1 
 " 1
"
+

~AH
~AL
hX (PXH )

1 
 " 1
"
 "
" 1
; (138)
where PXH is given by (109), P
X
L is given by (110), r =
+g
1 r , h
X is given by (123)
(observing (126) and (122)), hAH is given by (127), h
A
L is given by (128), ~AH= ~AL is
given by (85), r = +g
1 r and l
X = l.
Additional trickle-down dynamic analyses (discussed in section 6.3)
 In section 6.1 we introduced the threshold time span t^ (see Figure 1), after which
an increase in the share of tax revenue devoted to higher education, sE, by ve
percentage points raises net income type l individuals, yl, more than an equally
57
sized increase in the share of tax revenue devoted to redistributive transfers, sT .
Figure A.1 shows t^ as a function of the (derived) elasticity of substitution between
the two types of labor,  . As discussed as rst point in section 6.3, a nite t^
always exists for the considered range of  ; the function displayed in Figure A.1
is increasing, convex for low values of  , and concave for high values of  .
1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8
50
100
150
200
t
Figure A.1: Threshold time span t^ as a function of the derived elasticity of substitution
between the two types of labor,  . Set of parameters as in Table 1.
 In Figure A.2, we show the evolution of consumption of a type l individual, cl,
again normalized to the intitial stady state level before the policy reform, cl ,
in response to an increase in sE and sT separately by ve percentage points.
Qualitatively, the evolution of cl=cl is similar to the evolution of normalized net
income, yl=yl shown in Figure 1. Quantitatively, we see a less pronounced initial
impact of policy reforms compared to that on net income, reecting consumption-
smoothing behavior. After the "education reform" consumption levels of low-
skilled workers are equated with those under the baseline scenario after 21 years.
The intersection point with the scenario "redistribution reform" is 118 years.
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Figure A.2: Time path of normalized consumption, cl=cl , in three scenarios: solid (blue)
line: baseline scenario (sT and sE remain constant), horizontal dashed line: sT increases by
ve percentage points, increasing dashed line: sE increases by ve percentage points. Set of
parameters as in Table 1.
 Alternatively to evaluating an increase in sE and sT separately, section 6.3 also
discussed an increase (decrease) in the fraction of total tax revenue devoted to
education, sE, while at the same time reducing (raising) the fraction devoted to
transfers, sT , such that the sum of the two fractions, sE + sT , remains constant.
The results from these policy reforms, changing both sE and sT simultaneously
in opposite directions by one percentage points, are given in Figure A.3. We see
that, on impact, total net income yl decreases when expanding education and
increases when extending redistribution. The transition paths after the initial
response are in opposite directions. Again, a policy reform towards expanding
education is harmful in the shorter run, but leads to trickle-down growth in the
longer run. A policy reform towards extending redistribution which lowers the
fraction of tax revenue devoted to education is benecial in the shorter run, but
harmful in the longer run. It takes about 90 years for an increase in sE while
reducing sT to increase yl compared to both the baseline scenarion without policy
reform and the policy alternative to increase in sE while reducing sT .
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Figure A.3: Time path of normalized income, yl=yl , in three scenarios: solid (blue) line:
baseline scenario (sT and sE remain constant), dotted (green) line: sT increases by one
percentage point and sE decreases by one percentage point, dashed (red) line: sE increases
by one percentage point and sT decreases by one percentage point. Set of parameters as in
Table 1.
 We next examine the e¤ect of an increase in the tax rate on bond holdings,  r,
by one percentage point to  r = 0:18 for two purposes: (i) to nance an increase
in growth-adjusted transfer ~T , according to government budget constraint (67),
while holding constant both the fraction of human capital devoted to higher
education, # and the government expenditure share on transfers sT ;22 (ii) to
nance an increase in #, according to government budget constraint (66), xing
both the expenditure share for education, sE, and the growth-adjusted transfer
~T to its initial level.23 In policy experiment (i), as displayed by the dotted line
in Figure A.4, type l households gain on impact but soon lose even compared to
the baseline scenario without policy reform. The underlying reason is a decline
in the fraction of human capital devoted to both kinds of R&D (not shown),
eventually depressing net income yl. In this sense, increasing the tax rate on
bond holdings distorts R&D investments. In policy experiment (ii), as displayed
22In experiment (i), the education expenditure share sE may change along the transition; it is
determined by (66).
23In experiment (ii), the expenditure share sT may change along the transition; it is determined by
(67).
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by the dashed line in Figure A.4, type l households lose on impact. Again,
like for Figure 1, the reason is human capital is reallocated towards educational
production. Interestingly, and contrary to Figure 1, they lose even more in the
longer run because of the distortive e¤ect of raising  r on R&D investments.
Nevertheless, after t^ = 57 years they are better o¤ in terms of net income from
policy experiment (ii) as compared to (i).
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Figure A.4: Time path of normalized net income, yl=yl , in three scenarios: solid (blue) line:
baseline scenario; dotted line: increase in  r by one percentage point is used to nance an
increase in ~T , dashed line: increase in  r by one percentage point is used to nance an
increase in #. Set of parameters as in Table 1.
 Figure A.5 displays the same policy experiments than Figure A.4 except that now
the labor income tax rate of type h individuals, h, rather than  r is increased
by one percentage point to h = 0:36. Qualitatively, the e¤ect of extending
transfers (experiment (i)) and expanding education (experiment (ii)) is similiar
as in Figure 1; compare the horizontal and the increasing lines in Figure 1 and
Figure A.5. The result is an implication of the fact that labor income taxation
does not distort the allocation of human capital in our model. Compared to
Figure 1, net income yl becomes higher under education expansion (experiment
(ii) rather than (i)) earlier than in Figure 1, with t^ = 55 (rather than 97 years).
61
0 50 100 150
t
1.000
1.005
1.010
1.015
1.020
yl,t yl
t
Figure A.5: Time path of normalized net income, yl=yl , in three scenarios: solid (blue) line:
baseline scenario; horizontal dashed line: increase in h by one percentage point is used to
nance an increase in ~T , increasing dashed line: increase in h by one percentage point is
used to nance an increase in #. Set of parameters as in Table 1.
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Abstract 
The paper revisits the debate on trickle-down growth in view of the widely discussed evolution of the 
earnings and income distribution that followed a massive expansion of higher education. We propose a 
dynamic general equilibrium model to dynamically evaluate whether economic growth triggered by an 
increase in public education expenditure on behalf of those with high learning ability eventually trickles 
down to low-ability workers and serves them better than redistributive transfers. Our results suggest that, 
in the shorter run, low-skilled workers lose. They are better off from promoting equally sized redistributive 
transfers. In the longer run, however, low-skilled workers eventually benefit more from the education 
policy. Interestingly, although the expansion of education leads to sustained increases in the skill 
premium, income inequality follows an inverted U-shaped evolution.
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